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ROTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The issue in this case is whether an alien released on 
Aconditional parole@ under section 236 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) has been Aparoled into the United States@ 
so that she is statutorily eligible to adjust her status under INA ' 
245 to that of a lawfully admitted permanent resident.  Angelica 
Maria Delgado-Sobalvarro and her daughter, Lillyeth Delgado-
Carvajal, petition for review of the order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their application for 
adjustment of status.  The BIA concluded that the petitioners 
were not statutorily eligible for adjustment of status because 
they were not paroled into the United States.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the decision of the BIA and deny the 
petition for review. 
 
II.  Background 
 
Delgado-Sobalvarro and her daughter are natives of 
Nicaragua.  They arrived in the United States on November 19, 
2001, near Hidalgo, Texas.  At that time, they were detained by 
immigration authorities and issued Notices to Appear, which 
charged them with removability pursuant to INA ' 
212(a)(6)(A)(i) for being present in the United States without 
having been admitted or paroled.  Pending a decision on their 
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removability, the petitioners were released on conditional parole 
on their own recognizance in accordance with INA ' 236.    
 
Removal proceedings commenced in 2002.  On June 6, 
2003, Delgado-Sobalvarro married United States citizen James 
Rathof.  Rathof then filed I-130 immediate relative petitions for 
Delgado-Sobalvarro and her daughter.  Rathof and Delgado-
Sobalvarro subsequently had two children together. 
 
On August 14, 2006, Immigration Judge Fredric G. Leeds 
issued an order concluding that the petitioners were statutorily 
ineligible to adjust their status because they pointed to Ano 
binding authority establishing that conditional parole under INA 
' 236(a)(2)(B) is considered parole for adjustment of status 
purposes.@  The IJ further ruled that, even accepting the 
petitioners= conditional parole argument, their failure to present 
valid entry documents still rendered them ineligible to adjust 
status.  Additionally, because Delgado-Sobalvarro married 
Rathof during the pendency of her removal proceeding, the IJ 
concluded that she was ineligible to adjust status under INA ' 
245(e)(1).  Nor could Delgado-Sobalvarro qualify for the 
exception provided by ' 245(e)(3) for an alien who establishes 
by clear and convincing evidence that she married in good faith 
because she did not present any marriage documents.  The IJ 
also denied the petitioners= request for a continuance in order 
that the I-130 immediate relative petition could be adjudicated.  
Accordingly, the IJ ordered the petitioners removed to 
Nicaragua. 
 
Rather than appeal the IJ=s decision, the petitioners filed a 
motion to reconsider.  The petitioners argued that the IJ erred in 
holding that they were ineligible to adjust status and that 
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Delgado-Sobalvarro failed to establish the bona fides of her 
marriage by clear and convincing evidence.  On September 26, 
2006, the IJ denied the petitioners= motion to reconsider, holding 
that petitioners insufficiently addressed his prior reasons for 
concluding that they were ineligible to adjust status.  The IJ also 
confirmed his previous ruling that Delgado-Sobalvarro failed to 
establish the validity of her marriage under ' 245(e)(3) and that 
she could not do so Aby merely appearing in Court with a child 
and pregnant.@  Finally, the IJ again denied the request for a 
continuance pending resolution of the I-130 petition filed by 
Rathof. 
 
The petitioners appealed the IJ=s decision to the BIA, 
arguing that (1) production of a hearing transcript was necessary 
to review the proceedings below, (2) the IJ erred in finding that 
conditional parole did not render them eligible to adjust status, 
(3) Delgado-Sobalvarro established the bona fides of her 
marriage, (4) the proceedings should have been continued to 
allow the I-130 immediate relative petition to be processed, and 
(5) the IJ prematurely denied their claims.  On February 8, 2008, 
the BIA affirmed the IJ=s orders and dismissed the appeal.  First, 
the BIA found that the petitioners were not denied due process 
by not receiving hearing transcripts because, under the BIA=s 
rules, such transcripts are not typically provided in appeals of 
motions to reconsider and the petitioners could not demonstrate 
prejudice. Second, the BIA agreed with the IJ that the petitioners 
were ineligible to adjust status because release on conditional 
parole Ais not the type of >parole= that would impact the 
[petitioners=] adjustment eligibility,@ a finding that rendered 
moot the validity of the marriage and the continuance pending a 
decision on the I-130 petition.  Finally, the BIA determined that 
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the IJ=s denial of the petitioners= claims was not untimely.  The 
BIA therefore affirmed the IJ=s orders.  
 
On appeal, the petitioners concede that they are 
removable as charged.  They contend, however, that their 
November 19, 2001, release on conditional parole pursuant to ' 
236 renders them eligible for an adjustment of status under ' 
245.  
  
III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. ' 1252(a).  We exercise plenary review over the BIA=s 
determination that the petitioners are statutorily ineligible for 
adjustment of status.  Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 204 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  In so doing, we review the BIA=s legal conclusions 
de novo, Aincluding both pure questions of law and applications 
of law to undisputed facts.@  Rranci v. Att=y Gen. of U.S., 540 
F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008).    
 
IV.  Discussion 
 
INA ' 245 provides a mechanism whereby certain aliens 
present in the United States can adjust status to become lawful 
permanent residents.  8 U.S.C. ' 1255(a).  Section 245(a) states: 
 
The status of an alien who was inspected and 
admitted or paroled into the United States . . . may 
be adjusted by the Attorney General . . . to that of 
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence if (1) the alien makes an application for 
such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive 
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an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United 
States for permanent residence, and (3) an 
immigrant visa is immediately available to him at 
the time his application is filed. 
 
Only if an alien has been Aadmitted or paroled into the United 
States@ does she become eligible to adjust her status.  In this 
case, however, the petitioners were released on Aconditional 
parole;@ they were not Aadmitted@ within the meaning of ' 245.  
Cf. Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 117 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(AParoled aliens are not admitted to the United States.@).  
Therefore, the only question presented is whether the petitioners 
were Aparoled into the United States.@ 
 
There are two separate INA provisions that authorize the 
parole of aliens.  First, INA ' 212(d)(5)(A) specifically refers to 
Aparole into the United States@ and provides: 
 
The Attorney General may . . . parole into the 
United States temporarily under such conditions 
as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis 
for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit any alien applying for admission to 
the United States. 
 
8 U.S.C. ' 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added).  In contrast, INA ' 
236(a) refers to Aconditional parole@ and provides: 
 
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an 
alien may be arrested and detained pending a 
decision on whether the alien is to be removed 
from the United States.  Except as provided in 
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subsection (c) of this section and pending such 
decision, the Attorney General B  
 
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and 
 
(2) may release the alien on B 
 
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security 
 provided by, and containing  conditions 
 prescribed by, the Attorney General; or 
 
(B) conditional parole; but 
 
(3) may not provide the alien with work 
authorization (including an Aemployment 
authorized@ endorsement or other appropriate 
work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence or otherwise would 
(without regard to removal proceedings) be 
provided such authorization. 
 
8 U.S.C. ' 1226(a) (emphasis added). 
 
The petitioners raise a question of first impression in this 
Circuit:  does conditional parole under ' 236 constitute parole 
into the United States for the purposes of adjustment of status 
under ' 245?  We conclude that it does not. 
 
In In re Castillo-Padilla, the BIA determined that 
conditional parole under ' 236 differs from parole under ' 212 
and, therefore, does not make an alien eligible to adjust status 
under ' 245.  25 I.&N. Dec. 257, 258 (BIA 2010).  There, a 
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Mexican citizen was detained by immigration authorities for 
being present in the United States without having been admitted 
or paroled.  He was released upon posting bond and argued that 
he received conditional parole under ' 236(a)(2)(B), which 
made him eligible to adjust his status under ' 245.  On these 
substantially similar facts, the BIA concluded that A>conditional 
parole= under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Act is a distinct and 
different procedure from >parole= under section 212(d)(5)(A) and 
that the respondent is not eligible to adjust his status under 
section 245(a) based on his conditional parole.@  Id. 
 
Because there is no clear, unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress that speaks Adirectly . . . to the precise 
question at issue,@ we must analyze the BIA=s interpretation of 
the statutes for reasonableness.  Zheng, 422 F.3d at 112 (quoting 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984)).  We will limit our inquiry Ato determining 
whether the BIA=s statutory interpretation is based on a 
reasonable, permissible construction of that statute.@  See Tineo 
v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 396 (3d Cir. 2003); see also id. 
(AThere is . . . no longer any question that the BIA should be 
accorded Chevron deference for its interpretations of the 
immigration laws.@).  
 
Our examination of the statute confirms the BIA=s 
interpretation B Aparole into the United States@ is not the same as 
Aconditional parole.@  First, the language of the adjustment 
provision in ' 245(a) refers specifically to Aparoled into the 
United States.@  It is reasonable to interpret the statute to allow 
aliens to adjust status if they were Aparole[d] into the United 
States@ under ' 212(d)(5)(A), which uses nearly identical 
phrasing, but not if they were released on Aconditional parole@ 
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under ' 236(a)(2)(B).  See Castillo-Padilla, 25 I.&N. Dec. at 
260 (AIt is true that section 236(a)(2)(B) uses the phrase 
>conditional parole,= but that is not the phrase used in section 
245(a).@).   
 
Second, the history of the statute suggests that Congress 
sought to limit the universe of those who could adjust status to 
aliens whose admission was Afor urgent humanitarian reasons or 
significant public benefit@ as set forth in ' 212(d)(5)(A).  See 
Castillo-Padilla, 25 I.&N. Dec. at 259 (' 212 authorizes aliens 
to be temporarily paroled into the United States based on strict 
criteria, whereas ' 236 places no such restrictions on aliens 
released on conditional parole).  The idea of Aparole@ was added 
to ' 245 in 1960 to provide refugees an opportunity to become 
lawful permanent residents.  See S. Rep. No. 86-1651 (1960), as 
reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3137 (the addition of 
parole was Anot to grant eligibility for adjustment of status . . . to 
aliens who entered the United States surreptitiously@).  Congress 
maintained this distinction after passage of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 
 The most recent Department of Homeland Security 
memorandum on this issue explains that Aparole under section 
212(d)(5)(A) is permitted only after a case-by-case assessment@ 
based on specific criteria.  (Mem. of Gus P. Coldebella, dated 
Sept. 28, 2007, at 4); see also Castillo-Padilla, 25 I.&N. Dec. at 
263 (citing the Coldebella memorandum but noting that Asuch 
internal guidance memoranda are not binding authority@).  In 
contrast, ' 236 merely provides a mechanism whereby an alien 
may be released pending the determination of removal, as long 
as she is not a Adanger to persons or property@ and Ais likely to 
appear for any further proceeding.@  Castillo-Padilla, 25 I.&N. 
Dec. at 261 (citing 8 C.F.R. ' 236.1(c)(8) (2010)).  To allow 
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aliens released on conditional parole under ' 236 to adjust status 
under ' 245 would frustrate Congress=s intention to limit 
eligibility to refugees whose admission provides a public benefit 
or serves an urgent humanitarian purpose.  
 
Here, the petitioners were released on conditional parole 
after arriving illegally in the United States.  As in Castillo-
Padilla, they submit that their parole under ' 236 is equivalent 
to Aparole into the United States@ under ' 212 and seek to adjust 
status.  Although we are empathetic, we also are mindful of our 
obligation to respect what we find to be a reasonable 
interpretation of these statutes by the BIA.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the petitioners are not eligible to adjust status 
under ' 245 on the basis of their ' 236 conditional parole.  
 
We similarly reject the petitioners= argument that the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings was compromised by 
the absence of taped proceedings, the failure to provide 
transcripts, and the five-year delay in adjudicating the I-130 
petitions.  To establish a violation of due process, the petitioners 
must show that substantial prejudice resulted from the alleged 
procedural errors.  Khan v. Att=y Gen. of U.S., 448 F.3d 226, 236 
(3d Cir. 2006).  However, the errors that the petitioners urge us 
to recognize require too strained a series of inferential leaps.  
From 2002 through 2005, the petitioners= case was handled by 
Immigration Judge William Strasser. They argue that the 
absence of tape recordings from the proceedings before IJ 
Strasser prevents them from knowing what positions he took.  
Speculating that IJ Strasser may have taken a position favorable 
to the petitioners= claims, they assert that IJ Leeds would have 
been influenced by IJ=s Strasser=s positions and reached a 
different conclusion.  Similarly, the petitioners argue that if the 
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BIA had granted their request for transcripts, the BIA would 
Aprobably@ have identified Airregularities or mistakes@ in the 
proceedings below that would have affected the BIA=s decision. 
 Not only are these contentions entirely speculative, but they do 
not give rise to any demonstrated prejudice, let alone substantial 
prejudice.  Accordingly, the petitioners are not entitled to relief 
on these due process claims.  
 
With respect to the I-130 petitions, the petitioners believe 
that the delay Amay have impacted the IJ and Board decisions 
not to grant further continuances.@  However, the IJ was well 
within his discretion to deny the request for a continuance, since 
he concluded that the petitioners were not eligible to adjust their 
status.  See Khan, 448 F.3d at 234-35 & n.7 (it is not an abuse of 
discretion to deny a continuance if the alien fails to make out a 
prima facie case for adjustment of status).  We agree that the 
petitioners are ineligible to adjust their status.  Thus, they cannot 
demonstrate prejudice from any delay in adjudicating the I-130 
petitions. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the BIA=s order 
and deny the petition for review. 
